According to the widely accepted opinion, classical (statistical) physics does not support objective indeterminism, since the statistical laws of classical physics allow a deterministic hidden background, while -as Arthur Fine writes polemizing with Grünbaum -"the antilibertarian position finds little room to breathe in a statistical world if we take laws of the quantum theory as exemplars of the statistical laws in such a world. So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory."
1. To avoid a kind of "Comedy of Errors" I should specify in a very strict way what I mean under "free will" and how it relates to "indeterminism". However, the full analysis of these two notions would be outside the scope of this paper. The only thing I can do is to describe that particular aspect of the question on which we focus our attention.
"""""""" ! """""""" Each arrow in Fig. 1 symbolizes a particular item within the problem of the freedom of human action: how the mental states determine human actions, how the mental state at time t is determined by the mental state at an earlier time t 0 , are the brain processes deterministic or indeterministic, how the mental states and the brain states are related, etc. Without going to these details I would like to recall three different concepts of the freedom of the will.
A) According to the commonsense understanding, the freedom of the will means that someone can do what he thinks to do. This concept of freedom is connected to the problem of relation between the acts and mind states.
B) According to another concept, free will means the subjective feeling of that someone's future decision or future thought is open for himself. In this way the freedom of the will relates to the problem of autopredictability of an evolving system.
These first two interpretations of free will are entirely compatible with determinism:
In case A) a deterministic world even helps to feel a real correlation between someone's action and thoughts.
In case B), as MacKay (1967) proved by applying Popper's (1982) result concerning the limitations governing auto-predictability of a deterministically evolving system, the subjective feeling of freedom is provided even if the world were as mechanical as clockwork. Now I offer to accept, for our purposes, Campbell's definition of the freedom of the will: C) One's action is free only if one could have acted differently under the same circumstances. In other words, the relation between the acts at time t and the circumstances (see Fig. 1 ) at time t 0 is not deterministic.
For sake of brevity I shall call this process starting with the given circumstances at time t 0 and terminating with the acts at time t as "choice process". Free will, as it is understood in C), is not accommodated in a deterministic universe. In a deterministic world the choice process is also deterministic, therefore Campbell's freedom of the will, by definition, does not exist.
2. Adolf Grünbaum rejects Campbell's conception of the freedom of the will as inadequate. He argues that we would not have this libertarian kind of freedom even if the choice process were governed by probabilistic laws. The argument proceeds as follows.
Suppose that an individual X can act at time t in various ways denoted by x 1 , x 2 , ...x n , given some fixed circumstances at time t 0 . Assume we have a probabilistic theory describing his behavior according to which the probabilities of the different acts are 0 < p (x 1 ) , p (x 2 ) , ...p (x n ) < 1 (each probability is different from 0 or 1, otherwise the choice process would be obviously deterministic). One can interpret these probabilities as relative frequencies of the corresponding acts in two senses, either by taking a large statistical ensemble of identical X-like individuals, or by repeating many times the "experiment" with the same individual X under the same circumstances.
Does this probabilistic characterization of the choice process entail that an individual choice from the possible acts at time t is not determined in advance at time t 0 ? Grünbaum's answer is, definitely not. Suppose a community, he argues, which is subject to an indeterministic law according to which, in a long run, 80 percent of the population will commit a certain kind of crime. We can hold those members of the community who commit the crime morally responsible for their behavior only if, as the libertarian standard would have it, they could have done otherwise. But, the statistical law does not entitle us to say of an individual who commits the crime that he could have done otherwise. To be sure, on the basis of the law we cannot tell which particular individuals in the community will commit the crime. The law does not specify that. But this limitation does not entail that, in the very circumstances in which an individual commits the crime, he could have refrained from so doing.
However, as Arthur Fine (1993) pointed out, Grünbaum's argumentation depends on whether, in principle, the probabilistic model in question admits a deterministic hidden variable theory. And this is the case only if the probability model is a classical Kolmogorovian one, "but as we have come to learn in connection with foundational studies in the quantum theory, just such counterfactual distinctions may turn out to have unexpected and testable consequences", -as Fine (1993, p. 553 ) has rightly remarked. He turns then to prove "the conflict between antilibertarianism and the quantum theory" by considering a typical EPR-type experiment. He concludes: "If we assume that the quantum theory is correct in its statistical predictions and we hold to the reasonable no action-at-a-distance condition involved in the stated locality principle, then it follows that the statistical laws of the quantum theory cannot be given an antilibertarian interpretation.... So, it appears that, contrary to what Grünbaum claims, the libertarians' 'could have done otherwise' does indeed find support from indeterminism if we take the indeterministic laws to be of the sort found in the quantum theory." (pp. 555-556) Nonetheless, as Fine himself remarks, "the conclusion that Grünbaum draws may turn out to be more robust than the particular argument he gives for it ".
3. Let us turn now to a more careful analysis of the alleged conflict between antilibertarianism and the quantum theory. It is true that the quantum theory could turn out to be in conflict with antilibertarianism, but -as we will see it soon -it doesn't.
To decide whether a probability model is classical or not one needs something more than the probabilities p (x 1 ) , p (x 2 ) , ...p (x n ). Until we do not consider the conjunctions of events x 1 , x 2 , ...x n , that is, the events like "individual X executes acts x i and x j ", the probability model can be regarded as a classical/Kolmogorovian one admitting deterministic hidden variable theory. So, we must assume that the probabilistic model provides not only the probabilities p (x 1 ) , p (x 2 ) , ...p (x n ) but also probabilities p (x i &x j ) for some conjunctions x i &x j .
And now we inquire: How should we imagine a probabilistic description "of the sort found in the quantum theory" for the choice process?
Take a simple kind of example. Assume a nurse can offer four different things to a baby: scrambled eggs, pudding, tomato juice and coke. Each time she offers one kind of food together with one kind of drink. The situation is entirely analogous with the Aspect-type Einstein-PodolskyRosen experiment with spin-1 2 particles. The four detectors detect the spin-up events. The two switches are making choice from sending the particles to the Stern-Gerlach magnets directed into different directions. The observed events are the followings:
A : The "left particle has spin 'up' into direction a" detector beeps A ′ : The "left particle has spin 'up' into direction a ′ " detector beeps B : The "right particle has spin 'up' into direction b" detector beeps B ′ : The "right particle has spin 'up' into direction b ′ " detector beeps For the probabilities of these events, in case of (a, a ′ ) = (a ′ , b) = (a, b ′ ) = 120 • and (b, a ′ ) = 0, we have
These statistical data agree with quantum mechanical results, in the sense that
where the outcomes are identified with the following projectorŝ (ψ +a ⊗ ψ −a − ψ −a ⊗ ψ +a ). Nothing speaks against that the probabilities in (1) and (2) describe also the statistics of the baby's behavior if the nurse makes choice with equal frequencies between the two possible kinds of food and the two possible kinds of drink.
The numbers in (3) indeed violate the Clauser-Horne inequalities. But does it mean that the Aspect experiment as well as our baby's behavior cannot be accommodated in a deterministic universe, and consequently quantum mechanics provides the existence of Campbell's freedom of the will? Not at all! As it was shown in Szabó 1994 and Szabó 1995, quantum mechanics itself turns out to be reducible, that is, it admits a local deterministic hidden variable theory. At least, this is proved for the EPR experiments on which the libertarian quantum-indeterminists so often base their arguments. A "deterministic universe" includes not only the causal determination of the measurement outcomes, but it also includes causally deterministic decision processes of whether this or that measurement is being performed. No matter whether these decisions are made by machines like the switches in the Aspect experiment or by human beings, such processes must be deterministic in a deterministic world. So, if we ask whether the Aspect experiment admits a deterministic (and local) hidden variable theory, we must draw into the consideration the behavior of the switches, too (Cf. Brans 1988) .
It turns out that the whole system together can be deterministic: The probabilities in (1) and (2) form a correlation vector (see Pitowsky 1989) which satisfies Pitowsky's geometric condition: It is in the classical correlation polytope, p ∈ C (8, S max 28 ), which is a sufficient condition for reducibility, in the sense that the probability model in question is Kolmogorovian and admits a local deterministic hidden parameter theory (see Szabó 1995) .
The same holds for the baby's choice example. In an entirely deterministic world not only the baby's behavior is deterministic, but the nurse's decision is deterministic, too. And the whole "baby + nurse" system can be accommodated in a deterministic world. In other words, it can be the case that neither the nurse nor the baby has free will.
You may not like this solution of the problem, arguing that the nurse must have free will (as well as the switches in the Aspect experiment must be indeterministic) by assumption. But it should be clear that in this case the derivation of the freedom of the will from the quantum theory becomes tautology: if there exists free will then free will exists. Although, this result has been proved for a particular -but very important -case, one cannot raise any objection against believing that the same holds for an arbitrary situation in the quantum theory. And if it is so, Grünbaum's conclusion really "turns out to be more robust than the particular argument he gives for it".
